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I. INTRODUCTION
America's romance with professional football suffers every time
an off-the-field dispute finds its way into the headlines, especially if
the dispute finds its way into a courtroom. Professional football is
now big business, generating many millions of dollars for teams, com-
munities, and the National Football League (NFL). Nurtured by fan
support and enthusiasm, the football industry has grown into an eco-
nomic giant with power enough to forsake those responsible for its
success. Teams sometimes move in search of greener economic pas-
tures. When they move, they leave in their wake economically bat-
tered cities and emotionally disenchanted citizens. A city has a
significant but largely unrecognized interest in ensuring a return on
money invested to house and support a professional football team and
in furthering the public interest in recreation and social welfare. Cit-
ies now seek a means to legally protect these economic and welfare
interests.
Oakland, California, through its eminent domain power, asserted
its right to protect public investment and its citizens' psychological
bond with the team by attempting to prevent the Oakland Raiders
(Raiders) from relocating to Los Angeles in 1980.1 This novel exer-
1. City of Oakland v.'Oakland Raiders, 123 Cal. App. 3d 422, 176 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1981),
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cise of the eminent domain power-to condemn an NFL franchise as
intangible property-forced the courts to examine the interrelation-
ship between the state's eminent domain power and the federal Con-
stitution's commerce clause. In their attempt to categorize and solve
the problems presented by the condemnation of this unique type of
property, the California courts entangled themselves in a conceptual
and methodological muddle, producing obscure decisions, but per-
haps a correct result.
The competing interests involved in professional football are
unique to the business of sports. The structure of the NFL can be
viewed from two quite distinct perspectives. It may be seen as a single
entity that produces a single product, league football (fourteen foot-
ball games in a given week of the season). It may also be seen as an
arrangement bringing together pairs of separate business organiza-
tions (teams) whose competition is not only athletic but, potentially at
least, economic. These twenty-eight separate entities produce a differ-
ent product (local football). The interests of these two structurally
separate groups-the league (i.e., the teams collectively) and the
teams individually-do not always coincide. Rather, they serve to
complicate the process of identifying competing interests. The sym-
bolic bond between a team and its community further confuses mat-
ters. In its attempt to sort through this confusion, the court held that
because the NFL requires nationally uniform regulation, the control-
ling perspective is the league as an entity. Viewed from this perspec-
tive, condemnation of any one football franchise would impermissibly
burden interstate commerce.2
This Note first examines the dual structure of the NFL in the
context of the court's national uniformity rationale. It then explores
the competing economic and cultural interests generated by the
nature of NFL national and local professional football in the context
of both a balancing test and a local embargo analysis. After conclud-
ing that none of these methodologies pose a limitation to the condem-
nation, this Note finally suggests an ideological rationale behind the
court's decision.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
In 1980, after nearly fifteen years in the Oakland-Alameda
rev'd and remanded, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982), appeal after
remand, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3300 (1986).
2. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985)
(Raiders II), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3300 (1986).
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County Coliseum,3 the Oakland Raiders management,4 dissatisfied
with stadium facilities and the local television market, decided to
move the team to Los Angeles.5 Upon learning of the Raiders' plans,
the city of Oakland brought a condemnation action to prevent the
move.
6
The trial court granted the Raiders summary judgment and the
appellate court affirmed, holding that businesses and intangibles
unconnected to realty were not within the city's statutory condemna-
tion power.7 In City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, (Raiders 1)8 the
Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that California emi-
nent domain law authorized the taking of such intangible property,
and concluding that the only limits on the city's power are those
imposed by the federal Constitution. The court then explored the
issue of recreation as a valid public use, and stated that providing
access to spectator sports by acquiring, and even by operating, a
sports franchise, may be an appropriate function of city government.9
3. In 1966, the Raiders entered into a rental agreement with Oakland-Alameda County
Coliseum, Inc., a California nonprofit corporation. The agreement was for a five-year term
with five three-year renewal options. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646
P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982).
4. The Raiders football team belongs to a partnership managed by Al Davis. Id. at 63,
646 P.2d at 837, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
5. Id. The Raiders -were dissatisfied with the capacity and condition of the stadium
facilities and a stadium rule prohibiting a football game within 36 hours of any other athletic
event. Owner Al Davis admits that his decision to relocate was, at least in part, prompted by a
desire for increased unshared revenues. See Wong, Of Franchise Relocation, Expansion and
Competition in Professional Team Sports: The Ultimate Political Football?, 9 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 7 (1985); Note, Anticipating an Instant Replay: City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders,
17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 963, 967 n.20 (1984). The Raiders moved to the Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum, despite the City of Oakland's willingness to make both concessions and
improvements, including the construction of luxury box seats. Id. at 967 n.21. The Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum had lost the Los Angeles Rams as a major tenant in 1978 when
the Rams moved to Anaheim, California. Id. at 967-68.
6. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 123 Cal. App. 3d 422, 176 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1981),
rev'd and remanded, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982) (Raiders I). The
NFL team owners voted to disapprove the Raiders' move to Los Angeles. The Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Commission responded by bringing an antitrust action against the NFL,
alleging that the league's constitution and bylaws-which required that 75% of team owners
approve a club's move to another city-violated the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The
court agreed. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1384-85 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 990 (1984). See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
7. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 123 Cal. App. 3d 422, 176 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1981)
(construing California's eminent domain statutes and case law).
8. Raiders I, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673.
9. Id. at 71, 646 P.2d at 841, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 680. Several cases holding the
construction and maintenance of stadiums to be a valid public use led the court to question
whether "the obvious difference between managing and owning the facility in which the game
is played, and managing and owning the team which plays in the facility, [is] legally
substantial." Id. at 72, 646 P.2d at 842, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 680. Based on the record before it,
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The court remanded the case to give the city the opportunity to prove
a valid public use. 10
On remand,1' the trial court again found for the Raiders,' 2 hold-
ing that the taking would violate the commerce clause.' 3 In its argu-
ment, the city sought to utilize the market participant exception to the
dormant commerce clause. 14 On appeal, the Raiders II court rejected
the court concluded that the difference was not legally substantial. Id. (emphasis added). For
a discussion of the differences between owning a team and owning a stadium, see Note,
Eminent Domain Exercised-Stare Decisis or a Warning: City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders,
4 PACE L. REV. 169, 182-84 (1983).
10. Raiders 1, 32 Cal. 3d at 74, 646 P.2d at 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 682. The court stated
that "[i]f such valid public use can be demonstrated, the statutes ... afford City the power to
acquire by eminent domain any property necessary to accomplish that use." Id. at 71, 646 P.2d
at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
The court rejected the Raiders' argument that, should the city condemn the franchise and
then transfer it to a private party, the transfer would invalidate an otherwise valid public use.
The court stated that a transfer with adequate controls could preserve the public use, but the
adequacy of such controls would have to be evaluated in light of a specific retransfer
agreement. Id. at 72, 646 P.2d at 843-44, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
Commentators have questioned the propriety of a retransfer agreement because a
"[ft]aking for a direct private use ... is considered to be implicitly prohibited by the fifth
amendment." Comment, Taking the Oakland Raiders: A Theoretical Reconsideration of
Public Use and Just Compensation, 32 EMORY L. J. 857, 859 n.15 (1983). See West River
Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848) (There is no public use where the use is the
same as the original owner's use.). But see Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,
410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) (Alleviating unemployment and retaining local
industry is a valid public purpose; therefore, the city may condemn residential property for
retransfer to a private corporation.). California law explicitly allows retransfer. See CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 1240.120(b) (West 1982).
Chief Justice Bird, although forced to agree with the Raiders I result under the current
law, was troubled by the majority's approval of arguably limitless condemnation power
without considering the possible consequences of such expansiveness. Raiders I, 32 Cal. 3d at
76, 646 P.2d at 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 683 (Bird, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Although the Chief Justice referred to such expansion of eminent domain law as "creeping
statism," she felt compelled to call upon the legislature to provide restrictions, because "there
is no constitutional or statutory ground for barring the City's action." Id. at 79, 646 P.2d at
847, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
11. This was the second remand. Earlier, the appellate court held that the grounds on
which the trial court based its decision after remand had been foreclosed by the supreme
court's decision in Raiders I. The trial court, however, had not reached the critical question of
whether the taking would be for a valid public use. Therefore, the appellate court issued a
peremptory writ and remanded for a determination of this question without further
evidentiary hearings. City of Oakland v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 267, 280, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 729, 736 (1983).
12. See Raiders II, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 417, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
13. Id. at 421, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
14. The market participant exception permits a state to take proprietary action that
burdens interstate commerce when such action is not taken by the state as a regulator in its
sovereign capacity. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984)
(state may choose its customers but may not regulate subsequent actions of a private party,
and therefore, regulation requiring private buyers to process timber from state lands within the
state held invalid); White v. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983)
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the market participant argument because the city had not attempted
to enter the market as a private purchaser would, but had asserted its
governmental power to take the property. 5 The court then affirmed,
holding that this taking of intangible property would violate the com-
merce clause. 6
The Raiders H court acknowledged that imposing a burden on
interstate commerce that outweighs the benefit to the public violates
the commerce clause.1 7 The court relied on the arguably inapposite
case of Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co. 1 8 to support the
holding that professional football is so completely involved in inter-
state commerce that condemnation of the franchise would create an
impermissible burden. In Partee, the Supreme Court of California
had held that the application of state antitrust laws to professional
football would impermissibly burden interstate commerce because the
NFL's business requires nationally uniform antitrust regulation.19
After adopting the NFL's asserted need for nationally uniform regula-
tion, the Raiders II court concluded that the city's purposes of pro-
moting recreation, social welfare, and associated economic benefits
would not outweigh the burden that condemnation would impose on
interstate commerce.2°
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Power of Eminent Domain
Eminent domain is the inherent power of a sovereign state to
take private property.2 This power is provided for in the United
(city permitted to require that a certain percentage of city residents be employed on all city
funded or administered projects); Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (South Dakota could
restrict sale of cement from state-owned plant to in-state residents); Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (despite burden on interstate commerce, Maryland could
favor its own citizens in a junk recycling program because it was a market participant rather
than a regulator). In none of these cases, however, has the Court scrutinized the way the state
entered the market. Once the city is a participant in the market (through, for example,
condemnation) it is not at all clear that it cannot take advantage of the market participant
doctrine simply because of the means by which it entered the market.
15. "Here the city does not even cross the threshold of the marketplace except by first
exercising what has been characterized as a sovereign's 'most awesome grant of power'-
eminent domain." Raiders 11, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 418, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 156 (citation
omitted).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 34 Cal. 3d 378, 668 P.2d 674, 194 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1983).
19. Id.
20. Raiders I1, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 421-22, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
21. See County of San Mateo v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631, 634, 63 P. 78, 79 (1900) (Federal
and state governments have the inherent power of eminent domain.); 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT
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States Constitution, and its exercise requires only the satisfaction of
procedural due process, public use, and just compensation require-
ments.22 The power of eminent domain generally allows a govern-
mental entity to take any private property necessary to carry out its
functions. 3  States may delegate this power 24 to governmental sub-
units, such as municipalities, giving them the ability to satisfy their
local public needs. 5
Eminent domain results in a tension and compromise between
competing private property interests and public needs. 26 Some com-
mentators and courts argue that the power of eminent domain should
be broadly construed to facilitate public use of property.27 Others
argue that the power should be narrowly construed to prevent poten-
DOMAIN § 1.14 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter NICHOLS]; Stoeback, A General Theory of Eminent
Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 575-98 (1972).
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law"); U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation"); Chicago R.R. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 233-41 (1897) ("[S]ince the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, compensation
for private property taken for public uses constitutes an essential element in 'due process of
law,' and without such compensation the appropriation of private property to public uses...
would violate the provisions of the Federal Constitution." (quoting Scott v. Toledo, 36 F. 385,
396 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1888))). For an interpretive history of "taking for public use" and "just
compensation," see Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6
Wis. L. REV. 67 (1931); Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain,
20 B.U.L. REV. 615 (1940). For a general discussion of the just compensation requirement,
see Humbach, A Unifying Theory for the Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation and
Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 284-86 (1982). See also Meidinger, The "Public Uses"
of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1 (1980) (uses and consequences of
eminent domain in the United States).
23. See Raiders 1, 32 Cal. 3d at 65, 646 P.2d at 838, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (citing CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 37350.5 (West Supp. 1983)). "Through eminent domain, nations have been
able to acquire the property necessary to expand industry, develop the economy by
constructing roads and dams, satisfy aesthetic purposes by establishing parks and preserves,
redevelop worn urban areas, and provide 'private ways of necessity.'" Note, supra note 9, at
173 (citing Meidinger, supra note 22).
24. See Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371 (1904), aff'd, 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
25. The California eminent domain statute includes a city within the public entities that
possess the power of eminent domain. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1235.190 (West 1985); see
also Raiders 1, 32 Cal. 3d at 64, 646 P.2d at 838, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 675 ("[A] municipal
corporation has no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly
authorized by law.").
26. Raiders 1, 32 Cal. 3d at 64, 646 P.2d at 838, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 676 ("When properly
exercised, [the power of eminent domain] affords an orderly compromise between the public
good and the protection and indemnification of private citizens whose property is taken to
advance that good.").
27. Bensley v. Mountain Lake Water Co., 13 Cal. 306, 315 (1859); see Note, City of
Oakland v. Oakland Raiders: Defining the Parameters of Limitless Power, 1983 UTAH L. REV.
397, 399 ("To facilitate the taking of property when it is for the public good, the concept
should be broadly construed.").
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tial abuse by governmental entities.28
1. PROPERTY SUBJECT TO CONDEMNATION
A state may use its eminent domain power to condemn tangible
property,2 9 as well as various types of intangible property.3 ° Some
state courts have allowed condemnation of intangible property only
when it is incidental to tangible property that is the subject of the
action, 3' because just compensation can often be determined accu-
28. See Note, supra note 27, at 399-400 ("[S]ociety's interest in protecting a private
property owner from the potential abuse of eminent domain power dictates a narrower
definition of property." (citing Raiders I, 32 Cal. 3d at 65, 646 P.2d at 838, 183 Cal. Rptr. at
676)).
29. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Louisville & N.R.R., 223 U.S. 390, 400 (1912) (state has
power to put land to common use and benefit); Chicago R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-40
(1897) (indemnification of private citizens whose property is taken to advance public good is
constitutionally ordained by the fifth amendment applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment); Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 385-86 (1893) (full and
fair trial provided due process of law under fifth and fourteenth amendments in deprivation of
property case); Lent v. Tillson, 140 U.S. 316 (1891) (statute authorizing widening of street held
to provide due process of law for taking the property necessary for that purpose); Sutfin v.
California, 261 Cal. App. 2d 50, 67 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1968) (real or personal private property
taken or damaged for a public use must be compensated); Less v. City of Butte, 28 Mont. 27,
33, 72 P. 140, 142 (1903).
30. See Raiders 1, 32 Cal. 3d at 68, 646 P.2d at 840, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 678 ("numerous...
decisions both federal and state have expressly acknowledged that intangible assets are subject
to condemnation"); City of N. Sacramento v. Citizens Utility Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 482, 13
Cal. Rptr. 538 (1961) (city condemned water supply system).
Courts have found various types of intangible property subject to condemnation. The
more common case involves intangible property rights related to real estate. See Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (materialman's lien); Stratford Irrigation Dist. v. Empire
Water Co., 58 Cal. App. 2d 616, 623-24, 137 P.2d 867, 874 (1943) (lien); Canyon View
Irrigation v. Twin Falls Canal, 101 Idaho 604, 605-06, 619 P.2d 122, 125-26 (1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981) (easements); Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo. 618, 620, 232 S.W. 1024,
1027 (1921); Meredith v. Washoe County School Dist., 84 Nev. 15, 16, 435 P.2d 750, 752
(1968) (restrictive covenants); see also City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) (choses
in action, patent rights, charters, and other forms of contractual rights are subject to
condemnation); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949) (trade routes taken
during wartime); Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. United States, 274 U.S. 215 (1927) (contract
value); Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 44 (1909) (government-granted
franchises); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1892) (franchise
rights destroyed by government are compensable); West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 507, 534 (1848) (franchise rights were held compensable and nothing more than
"incorporeal property"); Note, supra note 27, at 400 n.23 (distinguishing from government-
granted franchises those granted by the NFL to team owners, which are "agreement[s] to
undertake a business or sell for a profit in accordance with the franchising body's rules").
31. See Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 690 (1897)
("[I]mpairment... is a mere consequence of the appropriation of the tangible property" and is
incidental to other property taken.); West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 536
(1848) (McLean, J., concurring) (condemnation "acts upon the property and not on the
contract"); Note, supra note 9, at 186 (Condemnation of intangible property is appropriate
only when taken as an incident to tangible property that is the target of the action; therefore,
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rately only by adding the value of associated intangible interests. 2
Other courts have defined property more narrowly to exclude intangi-
ble property, however, because of the undesirability of compensating
parties for overly contingent interests.33
2. PUBLIC USE
The public use requirement has been the subject of much debate,
for there is no generally accepted definition of what is a valid public
use.3 4 In Raiders I, the Supreme Court of California stated that "[a]
public use defies absolute definition, for it changes with varying condi-
tions of society, new appliances in the sciences, [and] changing con-
ceptions of the scope and functions of government. 3
5
There are two general interpretations of the meaning of public
use, one narrow and the other broad. 6 The narrow view dictates that
"1since the Raiders' franchise is comprised primarily of contracts, it cannot properly be the
target of condemnation," although a sports facility can.).
32. See Note, California Eminent Domain Statute Allows the Taking of Any Type of
Property Interests-City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 6 WHITTIER L. REV. 135 (1984).
33. See United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 44 F. Supp. 936, 938-39 (S.D. Cal. 1942)
(liens); People v. Kipley, 171 Ill. 44, 51, 49 N.E. 229, 238 (1897) (labor required by appointee
to public office not property); Bennett v. Kroth, 37 Kan. 235, 237, 15 P. 221, 223 (1887)
(witness can be compelled to testify without compensation); Shelton v. Shelton, 225 S.C. 502,
83 S.E.2d 176 (1954) (inchoate dower rights); Comment, State Constitutional Limitations on
the Power of Eminent Domain, 77 HARV. L. REV. 717, 718 (1964) (goodwill of ongoing
business not compensable); see also 2 NICHOLS, supra note 21, § 5.24 (goodwill not
compensable).
34. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (the Court
created no clear test for determining when private property has been taken for public use);
New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 340, 1 N.E.2d 153, 155 (1936); Miller v.
City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374, 384, 378 P.2d 464, 470 (1963); Berger, The Public Use
Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203 (1978); see also 2A NICHOLS, supra note
21, § 7.02. At least five factors have been recognized in determining whether a taking is for a
public use, including "the court's interpretation of the need for economic and industrial
progress in the area; the possible improvement of otherwise worthless unoccupied land by
taking and subjecting the land to improvement; the necessity of using eminent domain power
to successfully undertake a project; any commercial or other benefit; and amusement and
recreation or possible aesthetic enjoyment." 2A NICHOLS, supra note 21, §§ 7.21, 7.211.
Courts also balance the potential harm to the individual and the potential benefit to society.
See Chicago R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Central Pac. Ry. v. Feldman, 152 Cal. 303,
306, 92 P. 849, 852 (1907).
To determine whether there is a public use, the court will look at "the facts and
circumstances surrounding the particular subject-matter in regard to which the character of
the use is questioned." Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 160 (1896). Under
the same circumstances, therefore, courts in different jurisdictions may come to different
conclusions on similar facts as to whether a taking is for a public use. See Clark v. Nash, 198
U.S. 361, 368-69 (1905) (public use determination depends on the facts of each case). See
generally Berger, supra.
35. Raiders 1, 32 Cal. 3d at 72, 646 P.2d at 842, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 680 (citing Barnes v.
City of New Haven, 140 Conn. 8, 15, 98 A.2d 523, 527 (1953)).
36. See Berger, supra note 34, at 205.
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public use means actual use by the public entity or by the general
public. 37 The broad view which is followed in most states 3 however,
defines public use as public benefit or advantage, 39 and does not
require either use by a public entity or that a large number of persons
participate in or directly enjoy the use.4°
California cases have held that recreation is a valid public use.4'
This is not a new or unpopular position. In 1923, the Supreme Court
of the United States stated that "[p]ublic uses are not limited, in the
modem view, to matters of mere business necessity and ordinary con-
venience, but may extend to matters of public health, recreation and
enjoyment." 42 The expansiveness of this broad definition has led
some courts and commentators to suggest that the public use require-
ment no longer acts as an effective limit on the eminent domain power
except, perhaps, where the taking does not benefit the public
37. Id. at 205-06; 2A NiCHOLS, supra note 21, § 7.02(l)-(2); Nichols, supra note 22, at
617, 626 ("To take property rights from A for transfer to B for B's private enjoyment is not a
public use, regardless of what ultimate public purpose the transaction is intended to further.").
38. See Nichols, supra note 22, at 626-33.
39. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (The Court implied that the public use
requirement might be satisfied by an aesthetic purpose.); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 369
(1905) (condemnation benefitting even a single individual may be a public use); Raiders I, 32
Cal. 3d at 69, 646 P.2d at 841, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 679 ("a use which concerns the whole
community or promotes the general interest"); Montana Power Co. v. Bokma, 153 Mont. 390,
457 P.2d 769, 772-73 (1969) (public use merely means public benefit or advantage).
40. See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161-62 (1896); Stockdale v.
Rio Grande Western Ry., 28 Utah 201, 214, 77 P. 849, 851 (1904).
To solve some of the problems caused by differing definitions of public use, some states
have enumerated valid public uses in eminent domain statutes. See Comment, The Public Use
Doctrine: 'Advance Requiem" Revisited, 1969 LAW & Soc. ORD. 688 (discussion of trend
toward legislatures comprehensively listing authorized public uses). But see CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1235.170 (West 1982) (eliminates pre-1975 listings of property and interests subject to
condemnation). Further, where the legislature has spoken, "[s]ubject to specific constitutional
limitations.., the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive." Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (upholding District of Columbia's use of eminent domain for
redevelopment purposes).
41. Examples of California's recognition of recreation as a public use include: City of Los
Angeles v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 423, 434, 333 P.2d 745, 751 (1959) (baseball field); Egan
v. City of San Francisco, 165 Cal. 576, 582, 133 P. 294, 296 (1913) (opera house); City of
Anaheim v. Michel, 259 Cal. App. 2d 835, 839, 66 Cal. Rptr. 543, 546 (1968) (parking
facilities at a stadium); County of Alameda v. Meadowlark Dairy Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d 80,
38 Cal. Rptr. 474 (1964) (county fair).
42. Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923). See Raiders I, 32 Cal.
3d at 69, 646 P.2d at 841, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 679 (Public use is "'a use which concerns the
whole community or promotes the general interest in its relation to any legitimate object of
government.' ") (quoting Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 284, 289 P.2d 1, 6
(1955)); Egan v. City of San Francisco, 165 Cal. 576, 582, 133 P. 294, 296 (1913) (a public
purpose is anything promoting the education, recreation or pleasure of the public); see also
New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. 457, 292 A.2d 580 (App.
Div. 1971), aff'd, 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545 (1972) (Condemning land for a sports complex is a
valid public use because the purpose is to promote recreation for the people.).
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whatsoever.43
B. The Commerce Clause
Pursuant to the commerce clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, Congress has the power to regulate commerce among the
states.' The commerce power was intended to give to the federal
government affirmative power adequate to secure to the people of the
United States the benefits of a single national economy. Beyond this,
the commerce clause has been a source of federal power to deal effec-
tively with national problems. As a consequence, where Congress
has acted, a state may not enact conflicting legislation.45
Where Congress has not exercised its power to regulate interstate
commerce in a specific area, the states may regulate, but the "dor-
mant '46 commerce clause prohibits state regulation that is aimed at,
or has the effect of, constructing barriers or burdens that might inhibit
the development of a single national economy.47 Accordingly, a state
43. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (housing development); Prince George's
County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 339 A.2d 278 (1975) (industrial park);
Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d
1 (1963) (trade center). But see In re Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 638 P.2d 549 (1981) ("Public
interest" or "public advantage" held not the same as public use; therefore, condemnation for
commercial redevelopment of the inner city held unconstitutional.). See generally Berger,
supra note 34 (discussing when a taking is proper); Note, The Public Use Limitation on
Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949) (discussing the death of the
public use requirement).
44. "The Congress shall have Power To... regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1 & 3. Commerce has been defined
as "[t]he exchange of goods, productions, or property of any kind . . . [and] [t]he
transportation of persons and property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 244 (5th ed. 1979). See
Note, supra note 9, at 191 ("[C[ommerce includes the transportation of property of any kind,
including a business.").
45. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851) ("[I]t is not the
mere existence of such a power, but its exercise by Congress, which may be incompatible with
the exercise of the same power by the States, and. . . the States may legislate in the absence of
congressional regulations."); Comment, Eminent Domain: Condemnation of Professional
Football Franchises and the Commerce Clause Defense, 28 How. L.J. 773, 783 (1985) ("Cooley
also affirmed that if Congress chose to act in the local area through regulation, then the
Congressional regulations would prevail in any conflict between state and federal regulations
because of the Supremacy Clause.").
46. The "dormant" commerce clause describes those areas that Congress has failed to
regulate although it possesses the power. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767
(1945) ("[I]n the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in
the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure
affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it."); Cooley v. Board of Wardens,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245
(1829); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
47. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1938);
Robbins v. Taxing Dist. of Shelby County, 120 U.S. 489, 498 (1887) ("[I]f a state can, in this
way, impose restrictions upon interstate commerce for the benefit and protection of its own
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may not regulate matters of national interstate commerce, except
where incident to regulating matters of local concern.4" The dormant
commerce clause, in effect, abolishes economic provincialism and pre-
vents states from fractionalizing the economy in recognition of the
theory that "the peoples of the several states must sink or swim
together."4 9 Thus, for example, a state may neither hoard its
resources or products for its own use by preventing their export, 50 nor
force its citizens to buy locally-produced goods by closing its borders
to similar goods from another state.5 In short, it cannot discriminate
against others in favor of its own citizens or construct barriers that
will fractionalize economic activity. Such "economic provincialism"
violates the commerce clause.
The Supreme Court has stated that where a state's regulatory
statute incidentally affects interstate commerce, and "[w]here the stat-
ute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest... it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."52
citizens, we are brought back to the condition of things which existed before the adoption of
the Constitution, and which was one of the principal causes that led to it."). Incidental
regulation of interstate commerce is permitted, but direct regulation is prohibited. Edgar v.
Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640-43 (1982).
48. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 128 (1978) (dormant commerce
clause precludes state regulation only where lack of national uniformity impedes interstate
commerce); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 774-75 (1945) ("[W]here the nature
of an enterprise is such that differing state regulation, although not conflicting, requires the
enterprise to comply with the strictest standard of several states in order to continue an
interstate business extending over many states, the extra-territorial effect which the application
of a particular state law would exact constitutes, absent a strong state interest, an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce."); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (state has authority to regulate matters of local concern as long
as the impact on interstate commerce does not seriously impede the flow of commerce, and
therefore, the incentive to regulate on a national level is slight); see also Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
359 U.S. 520 (1959) (Railroads and other forms of interstate transportation need national
uniformity of regulation. A court must balance the state's interest in regulating local affairs
against the national interest in uniform regulation to determine whether there is a need for
national uniformity.).
49. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (Prohibiting importation of low-
cost milk from another state violates the commerce clause because it amounts to a custom
duty).
50. See H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (Production of goods will be
encouraged by the certainty of free access to markets in every state.). Using this rationale, the
Supreme Court of the United States struck down a statute requiring local natural gas needs to
be met before the gas could be exported to other states. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U.S. 658 (1923).
51. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (Requiring a reciprocity
agreement with another state before the other state's milk could be imported violates the
commerce clause.); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
52. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding state statute that
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Thus, a state may impose costs or other burdens on participants in
interstate commerce that might tend to discourage that commerce
without violating the commerce clause. A court that applies this bal-
ancing test first must find a legitimate local interest. If there is such
an interest, the next step is to assess the burden imposed upon inter-
state commerce, and then to decide whether the state has alternatives
that would not cause as great a burden. 53 For a state statute to be
struck down requires a showing that "the state is acting in an area of
interstate commerce requiring uniformity if regulated, or that the
state's act discriminates against other states, or that the state's act
places an undue burden upon interstate commerce. '5 4
C. Eminent Domain and the Commerce Clause Defense
As the taking power has expanded to include ever more contin-
gent intangible property interests, the realm of valid public uses has
broadened to encompass almost any public benefit. Concurrently, the
traditional conception of sovereign condemnation power has been
incorporated as a legitimized means to accomplish modern police
power purposes that typically result in ever more intrusive and intui-
tively offensive takings.55 Consequently, intangible property interests
that are not confined to one place, but rather are involved in interstate
commerce are liable to be taken, and the probability of a commerce
clause defense to a taking is increased. If the commerce clause is not
required state fruit to be packed in-state invalid). In the case of legislation that is
nondiscriminatory, but somewhat burdensome on interstate commerce, the state regulation is
accorded a presumption of constitutionality. This presumption can be overcome by a clear
showing that the national interest in uniformity or in free commerce outweighs the state
benefit.
53. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (articulating this three-part test);
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("If a legitimate local purpose is found,
then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated
will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities."); Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (statute struck down where reasonable nondiscriminary
alternatives existed).
54. Comment, supra note 45, at 785. See J. WILLIAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN A
NUT SHELL 203 (1979) ("The states are prohibited from regulating commerce in ways which
are unduly burdensome or where national uniformity is required or where the effect is
discriminatory, unless Congress consents.").
55. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (Condemnation to resolve the
social and economic evils of land oligopoly is a valid means of exercising the police power.).
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit lends further support to the proposition
that the historic disapproval of the use of the eminent domain power for economic purposes as
opposed to its use for "pure" health, welfare, and safety purposes is disappearing. 410 Mich.
616, 632, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458 (1981) (Alleviating unemployment and retaining local industry
is a valid public purpose and the city may therefore condemn residential property for
retransfer to a private corporation.).
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violated because there is a legitimate public interest, then by necessary
inference there must be a valid public use, because the definition of a
public use is broader than the range of acceptable public purposes
under the commerce clause.56 The expansion of the condemnation
power to encompass purposes traditionally only permissibly served by
police power regulation provokes a greater need to examine the inter-
relationship and conflict between the condemnation power and the
commerce clause.
57
The unusual nature of this conflict is complicated by the unique-
ness of the NFL and professional football. The problems of attempt-
ing to define the structure of the NFL for all purposes, and translating
into legal terms the varying interests that professional football fosters,
defy a simple solution to this conflict.
Although there are cases in which a commerce clause defense has
been presented in an eminent domain action, such cases are distin-
guishable from Raiders 11.58 These cases involved takings that impli-
cated a clearly recognized interest in national uniformity with respect
to interstate roads and highways.5 9 This distinction is noted not to
56. Of course, this discussion assumes that the court has already decided the threshold
issue of whether the type of property in question is subject to condemnation under the
particular state's eminent domain statute.
57. See Bixby, Condemnation of Private Property in Order to Construct General Motors
Plant is for "Public Use": Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 13 URB. LAW.
694 (1981) (discussing factual background of Poletown); Comment, The Constitutionality of
Taking a Sports Franchise by Eminent Domain and the Need for Federal Legislation to Restrict
Franchise Relocation, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 581 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Taking
a Sports Franchise] (citing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984)) ("[Since
the Supreme Court recently held that the power of eminent domain is coterminous with the
state's police power, it appears that eminent domain proceedings will be treated in the same
manner as regulatory action."); Note, Public Use in Eminent Domain: Are There Limits After
Oakland Raiders and Poletown?, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 82 (1983) (discussion of Poletown and
Raiders I decisions); see also Comment, Eminent Domain: The Ability of a Community to
Retain an Industry in the Face of an Attempted Shut Down or Relocation, 12 OHIO N.U.L.
REV. 231, 231 (1985) (Impediments to the use of eminent domain to retain an industry in the
face of an attempted shutdown or relocation appear to be more economic and political than
legal in nature.).
Reversing the equation, one commentator has argued that an even more compelling
argument in support of the city's taking power may be made when the taking seeks to solve
sovereign concerns. A city's self-image and identity can undeniably be enhanced by having a
professional football team in town. "[A] state decision that implicates concerns close to the
core of the sovereignty concept should at least arguably be entitled to greater deference than
one that does not implicate such concerns." Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too Much-An
Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47, 61 (1981).
58. 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3300 (1986).
59. See Elberton S. Ry. v. State Highway Dep't, 211 Ga. 838, 89 S.E.2d 645 (1955) (The
State Highway Department's condemnation of railway property does not interfere with
interstate commerce.); 1 NICHOLS, supra note 21, § 2.222 ("[T]he right of the states to exercise
the power of eminent domain in such a way as to interfere with interstate commerce upon the
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imply that an exercise of the eminent domain power is exempt from a
commerce clause defense, but only to highlight the unique nature of
Raiders II, a point the Raiders H court appeared to recognize. The
Raiders II court noted that such a lack of relevant precedent meant
that this was a case of first impression, and that "eminent domain
cases have traditionally concerned real property, rarely implicating
commerce clause considerations which deal primarily with products
in the flow of interstate commerce." 6
IV. ANALYSIS
This section first examines the Raiders II court's decision in light
of its national uniformity rationale. After concluding that the
national uniformity rationale is inappropriate, this section presents
other possible rationales for analyzing the case and examines why
condemnation was necessary to secure the public interest. Finally, in
the following section, this Note suggests a possible theoretical mean-
ing behind the decision.
A. The Structure of the NFL
The Raiders H court concluded that the NFL requires nationally
uniform regulation because "[p]rofessional football is such a nation-
wide business and so completely involved in interstate commerce that
acquisition of a franchise by an individual state through eminent
domain would impermissibly burden interstate commerce. ' 61 If any
regulation is permissible, it must be nationally uniform regulation.
For this point, the court relied almost exclusively on Partee v. San
Diego Chargers Football Co.62
In Partee, a former NFL football player brought an antitrust
action against the San Diego Chargers, alleging that several of the
NFL's operating rules involving players63 violated California antitrust
highways and railroads within their respective limits may be at any time cut off by
Congress.").
60. Raiders I, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 418, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
61. Id. at 419, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 157. One commentator has suggested that the very
existence of the NFL exemplifies the need for national uniformity, because NFL teams
voluntarily submit to NFL rules. Comment, supra note 45, at 786. A need for regulatory
uniformity in some situations, however, does not necessarily compel a need in others. See infra
notes 79-86.
62. 34 Cal. 3d 378, 668 P.2d 674, 194 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1983).
63. The rules challenged include: 1) the draft, which grants NFL teams exclusive rights to
negotiate with eligible players that they select; 2) the option clause, which grants the team a
one year contract renewal right should player and team fail to reach agreement; 3) the
"Rozelle Rule," which requires a team signing a free agent to compensate the player's former
team; 4) the tampering rule, which prohibits negotiation with a player already under contract
to another NFL team; and 5) the one-man rule, under which the commissioner has authority
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law. 64 The Supreme Court of California held that state antitrust laws
are not applicable to the interstate activities of professional football. 65
Drawing support from Supreme Court opinions dealing with profes-
sional baseball, 66 the court concluded that "[flragmentation of the
league structure on the basis of state lines would adversely affect the
success of the competitive business enterprise, and differing state anti-
trust decisions if applied to the enterprise would likely compel all
member teams to comply with the laws of the strictest state."' 67 Thus,
because of the need for nationally uniform regulation, the burden on
interstate commerce imposed by applying California antitrust law
outweighed the state's interest in applying those laws.68
To support its reliance on Partee, the Raiders H court stated that
"[p]rofessional football's teams are dependent upon the league playing
schedule for competitive play . . . . The necessity of a nationwide
league structure for the benefit of both teams and players for effective
competition is evident as is the need for a nationally uniform set of
to compel players to adhere to collective bargaining agreements between players and NFL
teams. Id. at 381 n.2, 668 P.2d at 676 n.2, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 369 n.2.
64. Id. at 381, 668 P.2d at 676, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 369 (The court found that all but the
option clause violated California antitrust law.).
65. Id. at 380, 668 P.2d at 676, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 369. The court accepted the Chargers'
contention that "professional football is a unique activity which requires nationally uniform
governance . . . [and] that interstate commerce would be unreasonably burdened if state
antitrust laws were applied to professional football's interstate activities." Id. at 382, 668 P.2d
at 677, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
66. For this reason, the Partee decision itself is subject to question. In his dissent, Justice
Reynoso questioned the majority's reliance upon, and the applicability of, Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258 (1972) (state antitrust laws held inapplicable to professional baseball). Partee, 34 Cal.
3d at 386, 668 P.2d at 681, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 373 (Reynoso, J., dissenting). Flood was decided
on the basis of the inevitable conflict that would result if state antitrust regulations were
applied to baseball, given baseball's historical exemption from federal antitrust laws. See
Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (baseball exemption upheld based on
thirty years of Congressional inaction, baseball's consequent reliance on the exemption, and
deference to Congress for any remedy); Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S.
200 (1922) (baseball is not involved in interstate commerce). The Partee dissent argued that
because football does not enjoy an antitrust exemption, it would be wrong to apply baseball
precedent to football cases. Partee, 34 Cal. 3d at 388, 668 P.2d at 681, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 374
(Reynoso, J., dissenting) (citing Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957)).
Further, prior to Partee, federal courts had already held that the rules challenged in Partee
violated federal antitrust law. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Kapp v. National Football League, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907
(1979); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), petition for cert.
withdrawn, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). Justice Reynoso noted that because federal courts had
already held these practices violative of federal antitrust laws, it was difficult to see how a
harmonious state court decision could possibly result in practices that would burden interstate
commerce. See Partee, 34 Cal. 3d at 409, 668 P.2d at 696, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
67. Partee, 34 Cal. 3d at 384-85, 668 P.2d at 678, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 371-72.
68. Id. at 385, 668 P.2d at 679, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
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rules governing the league structure. '69 Although it may be true in
some situations that the NFL requires nationally uniform regulation,
and although such may have been the case in Partee,7 ° courts have not
found a need for national uniformity in all circumstances.
In another case that arose from the Raiders' move to Los Ange-
les, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football
League,"' the court specifically rejected the argument that the NFL is
a single entity exempt from federal antitrust laws.72 The NFL's own-
ers had voted to deny Al Davis permission to move the Raiders to the
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum. The Coliseum challenged that
denial as a violation of the Sherman Act." The court held that
"[w]hile the NFL clubs have certain common purposes, they do not
operate as a single entity. NFL policies are not set by one individual
69. Raiders II, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 420, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 157 (quoting Partee, 34 Cal. 3d
at 384-85, 668 P.2d at 678, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 371).
70. Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 34 Cal. 3d 378, 668 P.2d 674, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 367 (1983).
71. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 990 (1984). In 1978, the Los
Angeles Rams relocated to Anaheim, California. The Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
(Coliseum), left without a major tenant, asked the NFL to locate an expansion franchise in the
stadium. After the NFL declined, the Coliseum negotiated with the Raiders to move to Los
Angeles. The NFL Constitution, however, requires approval by 75% of the twenty-eight
member teams' owners before a team can move. See NFL CONST. art. IV, rule 4.3. In 1980,
the NFL's team owners voted 22-0 against relocation. The Coliseum then sued the NFL for
violating federal antitrust laws. The Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, Inc. intervened, and
the Raiders cross-claimed against the NFL. Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1385.
72. Because the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), prevents "only contracts,
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade," a business that can prove it is a single
entity will not have violated the Act because a business cannot conspire against itself. See
Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1387. In analyzing restraint of trade claims under the Sherman Act,
courts have defined two categories of cases. There is first a per se category, in which a restraint
is held to be inherently unreasonable regardless of any procompetitive effects from the
restraint. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (advocating a per se
rule). The second category is examined under a rule of reason analysis "[s]ince Congress
could not have intended that courts invalidate 'every' such agreement." Coliseum, 726 F.2d at
1386; see Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("The true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.");
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) (Sherman Act is concerned only with
unreasonable restraints). The rule of reason requires the court or jury to look at all the
circumstances and determine whether there is an unreasonable restraint on competition. In
Coliseum, the court found that the unique nature of the NFL precluded a per se rule. The
court held that the cooperative nature of the NFL would be considered under the rule of
reason analysis which takes all circumstances into account. Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390.
Considering all circumstances, the court held that the NFL violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act by restricting team movement. Id. at 1401. For an overview of antitrust law and
professional sports leagues, see Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports
Leagues Revisited: Emerging Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 729 (1987).
73. See supra note 72.
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or parent corporation, but by the separate teams acting jointly. '7 4
The court also noted that the purpose of the NFL, as set forth in the
NFL Constitution, is to "promote and foster the primary business of
League members, '7 5 as opposed to promoting the business of the
NFL itself. The court found that the teams are separate business enti-
ties that produce independently valued products.76 In addition, all
profits and losses are not shared by the teams as they would be if the
NFL were a single entity.77 Accordingly, the court held that the
NFL's relocation restrictions violated the antitrust laws, and that the
league could not prevent the Raiders from moving to Los Angeles.78
74. Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1388-89.
75. Id. at 1389 (quoting from article I of the NFL Constitution).
76. Id. at 1388.
77. Id. at 1390. Although all NFL teams share national television revenues and
competing teams share gate receipts from individual games, they do not share expenses, capital
expenditures, or profits. See Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of Franchise Relocation
Restrictions in Professional Sports, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 157, 172 (1984); Comment, A
Substantive Test for Sherman Act Plurality: Applications for Professional Sports Leagues, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 999 (1985) (discussion of organizational and financial structure of NFL).
78. Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1401. The Coliseum court implied that a rule restricting
relocation might be acceptable if it imposed procedural safeguards and provided objective
standards. Id. at 1397.
Other NFL rules had previously been held to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. See
North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Although it characterized the NFL as a joint venture and recognized the
need for cooperation among teams, the court held that restrictions preventing NFL owners
from owning teams in other professional sports leagues violated section 1.); see also United
States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (violation of section 1 found even though
organization was characterized as a joint venture); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1 (1945) (no immunity from section 1 simply because the cooperation allowed production that
individual members could not produce alone). In San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National
Hockey League, however, the court held that the National Hockey League is a single entity
and that it can therefore restrict team movement without violating the Sherman Act. 379 F.
Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974). The court in Coliseum found this case unpersuasive, stating that
Congress was best able to determine whether the NFL deserved antitrust immunity. Coliseum,
726 F.2d at 1390 n.4; see Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single
Entity under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1983) (Leagues must act jointly to be efficient and, therefore, should be
viewed as a single entity for some purposes.).
Indeed, the Coliseum court's determination that the NFL is not a single entity has been
subject to much criticism. See Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1401 (Williams, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). But see Blecher & Daniels, Professional Sports and the "Single Entity"
Defense Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 4 WHITIrER L. REV. 191 (1982) (concluding
that the single entity defense is inappropriate because sports leagues compete economically at
some levels); Lazaroff, supra note 77, at 169 (teams are separately owned, independent legal
entities that may violate section 1).
Even if the Coliseum court is incorrect in its determination that the NFL is not a single
entity, this holding merely demonstrates the difficulty courts have had in analyzing the
structure of the NFL, and suggests that the Raiders II court's blind reliance on Partee is
misplaced. The Coliseum dissent recognized that the NFL is a single entity only for certain
purposes. The dissent argued that "[t]he purposes for which the NFL should be viewed as a
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In Coliseum, the Coliseum argued that the NFL is not a single
entity requiring nationally uniform regulation, and the Coliseum
won.7 9 In Partee, the player argued that the NFL does not require
nationally uniform regulation, and the player lost.80 In Raiders I,
the city argued that the NFL does not require nationally uniform reg-
ulation, and the city lost, based on Partee.81 Antitrust issues, however,
were not even before the Raiders H court. The Raiders H court's
reliance on a single antitrust case without discussion of other relevant
antitrust cases and without examination of the underlying issues is
deceptively simplistic.8 2
If the NFL's dual nature precludes application of a single struc-
tural definition in all contexts, even-as Partee and Coliseum demon-
strate 8a-in the antitrust context, a similar discriminating analysis is
also likely to be necessary in dealing with the interrelation between
the eminent domain power and the dormant commerce clause. The
league rules that were the subject of challenge in Partee were rules
governing player negotiations and contracts. These rules were
directly concerned with promoting athletic rather than economic
single entity, impervious to § 1 attack, must be functionally defined as those instances in which
member clubs must coordinate intra-league policy and practice if the joint product is to
result." Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1409 (Williams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see
also Grauer, supra, at 2 (criticizing the Coliseum and Northern American Soccer League courts
for viewing the NFL teams as separate entities in all situations simply because they were so
viewed in some situations).
79. At this point, the relationship between the single entity and national uniformity
rationales should be clarified. In Partee, the court determined that the NFL requires national
uniformity insofar as choice of antitrust law was concerned. 32 Cal. 3d 378, 668 P.2d 674, 194
Cal. Rptr. 367. Once federal law applies, however, the structure of the NFL must be defined
within Sherman Act jurisprudence. An organization that meets the definition of a single entity
necessarily has a structure that requires uniform regulation because regulation of any part
affects the whole. Although the same conclusion can be reached with organizations that do
not meet the single entity definition, the relationship between regulation of a part and an effect
on the whole is much more attenuated. A structural organization that is not a complete
whole-so as to meet the single entity definition-cannot be said to require nationally uniform
regulation for all purposes.
80. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
82. An intriguing twist is Al Davis's ability to argue both views and win. In Coliseum, he
sided with the Coliseum, arguing that the NFL is not a single entity, and therefore, that his
team should be allowed to move. 726 F.2d at 1389-90. In Raiders I, however, he argued that
the NFL is a single entity requiring nationally uniform regulation, and therefore, a taking by
eminent domain would burden interstate commerce. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 419-20, 220 Cal.
Rptr. at 156-57. It is also ironic that a team owner and member of the NFL is yelling
"antitrust" at the other owners.
83. Compare Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 34 Cal. 3d 378, 668 P.2d 674, 194
Cal. Rptr. 367 (1983) (federal antitrust law applied because national uniformity needed) with
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
496 U.S. 990 (1984) (NFL single entity argument rejected in the surprising context of league
control of individual team relocation).
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competition between teams in the league and in preserving the quality
and competitive balance of the league's games. As such, these rules
necessarily had to be followed by all teams.84 The Coliseum court, on
the other hand, did not find a need for national uniformity where relo-
cation decisions were involved. Apparently, relocation decisions and
player negotiations do not have the same affect on the welfare of the
NFL as a whole.
Because Raiders II, like Coliseum, involves the ability of teams to
relocate rather than their ability to compete for players, Coliseum
would seem, on the face of it, the more nearly apposite case. As a first
approximation, one may question whether the NFL requires uniform-
ity of rules governing relocation decisions if the NFL itself cannot
control those decisions.85 Unless it can be demonstrated that a city,
by controlling team movement, is seriously prejudicing the economic
health of the NFL, and hence, is impeding national uniformity, the
taking should not be invalidated on a national uniformity basis.86 By
the same token, even if there may be some adverse economic effects
on the league if cities control team movement, that effect presumably
should be balanced against the public purpose served by the city's
exercise of its eminent domain power. It is not enough simply to use
the label "national uniformity" without examining the underlying
rationale for applying such a label. National uniformity seeks to
define when the economic structure is so unitary that there can only
be one regulatory authority, a federal one. Such indiscriminate label-
ing ultimately undermines the court's conclusion that the taking vio-
lates the dormant commerce clause because it leaves the underlying
issues unanswered.
B. National Uniformity and the NFL
Victories and team success foster sentimental loyalties, which
84. By equalizing teams' negotiating positions, the league fosters the teams' athletic
competition and business success on the theory that games between two relatively equal teams
are more interesting and profitable than games between a strong team and a weak team.
Partee, 34 Cal. 3d at 381, 668 P.2d at 676, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 369. Thus, if the rules at issue in
Partee are to be challenged, they should be challenged on the basis of federal law, which is
uniform and applicable to all teams, not on the basis of differing states' laws.
85. See Comment, supra note 45, at 787-88 (To meet the argument that the NFL requires
national uniformity, the city might argue that diversity of regulation would not impermissibly
burden interstate commerce because team locations do not require uniformity, although other
aspects of the NFL might.).
86. Because the NFL is engaged in interstate commerce, what burdens the NFL burdens
interstate commerce. See Partee, 34 Cal. 3d at 383, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 370, 668 P.2d at 677 ("It
is settled that the NFL is engaged in interstate commerce .... ") (citing Radovich v. National
Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957)).
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benefit the NFL in the form of increased fan support and increased
revenues. What distinguishes team relocations from normal business
moves is precisely this juxtaposition of economic and psychological
factors. Here, the NFL's economic health is intimately tied to these
psychological factors.
This psychological nexus yields high economic returns to the
NFL. The convergence of the NFL's quest for economic gain and the
city's psychological interest is what allows for these returns. The
city's and the NFL's interests are coterminous as long as there is a
successful team, such as the Raiders. Perhaps then, the NFL is only
harmed to the extent that the court has allowed a single team owner
to relocate contrary to the NFL's (and the city's) best interests. Of
course, the NFL is also harmed insofar as the city, by attempting to
condemn a football franchise, is defeating the private interest of the
individual owners who comprise the NFL. If condemnation is per-
mitted, every franchise owner will be, at least arguably, threatened by
the possibility of relocation.
Divergence of interests occurs to the extent that the private own-
ers do not share in the common interests of the NFL and the city.
The individual owner's pure private property interest then must be
compared to both the city's interests and the NFL's interest in the
integrity of the league. This divergence turns on how private team
owners use their unshared economic returns. The NFL is interested
in long-term gains in shared revenues, which requires that sufficient
profits be put back into the teams so as to increase competition, and
ultimately, shared revenues. Private owners, in contrast, may prefer
short-term pull-out of their individual profits to a long-term gain in
shared profits. If an owner relocates to enhance unshared revenues,
the NFL will be economically indifferent to the relocation only if the
move does not decrease shared revenues. The NFL is in conflict with
the owner only insofar as it believes the owner will not use the
increased private revenues to strengthen the team. Thus, where relo-
cation is prompted by the promise of increased unshared revenues, the
NFL is either indifferent or at odds with the private owner. Further,
the NFL is concerned with the overall harm to the integrity of the
NFL and with how much the enhanced revenues can compensate for
the damaged psychological relationship with the city when a success-
ful team relocates.
Where a franchise is financially unsuccessful, however, the city's
interest is greatly reduced, and the harm to the NFL from condemna-
tion is more pronounced. When a team is losing money, the NFL
does suffer indirectly because of the drain on shared revenues. Yet,
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because a city's interest in condemning a weak team is far less than its
interest in a financially stable team with substantial community sup-
port, the city's interest may be outweighed by the burden-the poten-
tial drain on league revenues-on the NFL as an national economic
entity. This problem is readily answerable by not permitting the city
to prevent a financially weak team from moving. Such a case is quite
different from Raiders II.
In discussing the burdens on interstate commerce, the Raiders II
court equated the interests of the team with those of the NFL. 7 As
has been stated, the two interests do not always coincide. This is
demonstrated by the NFL owners' desire to block the Raiders' move,
and by Al Davis's refusal to yield to the owners' vote against his
team's relocation. 8 Indeed, the real burden on the NFL is caused by
the team that wishes to move when the league wishes it to stay. Even
these burdens must, however, be quantified and measured within the
national uniformity methodology.
There is no product, no individual games, no NFL season, until
team A plays team B. Thus, the NFL is interested in controlling the
constituent parts in order to maintain the quality of the product. The
Raiders II court noted the "interdependent character of the NFL," in
that teams share television contract proceeds and gate receipts nearly
equally.89 NFL teams share network television revenues from regular
season and playoff telecasts, gate receipts, and marketing income.9 0
Each team, however, keeps all local radio, preseason television, and
luxury box seat revenues.91 The NFL has a significant interest in the
team revenues because approximately 90% of these revenues are
shared.92 As a result, "each League franchise owner has an important
interest in the identity, personality, financial stability, commitment,
87. See Raiders II, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 421, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
88. This strange twist underscores the complicated nature of the case. It's all very well to
talk about the "NFL," but the NFL is made up of 28 member teams. Therefore, where a team
relocates contrary to the expressed will of the other 27 teams, that team imposes a burden by
relocating. If the NFL is harmed at all, it is harmed, in this instance, by a member team. If,
however, the other owners support the move, the burden that the condemnation imposes on
interstate commerce would be clearer. It should also be noted that the burden imposed by the
move is different from the burden imposed by condemnation.
89. Raiders II, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 420, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
90. Network television revenues are shared equally; gate receipts are split, 60% for the
home team and 40% for the visiting team. Wong, supra note 5, at 16 n.44 (1985) (citing
Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity: Hearings on S. 2784 & S. 2821 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44 (1982) (statement of Pete Rozelle, NFL
Commissioner)).
91. See Wong, supra note 5, at 16.
92. Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390.
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and good faith of each other owner."'93 This being the case, it imme-
diately suggests that the NFL should have the right to select the mar-
ket in which a team plays because of the need to maximize regional
rivalries and revenues, thereby maximizing league effectiveness.
Given the importance of shared revenues, if a team's move could
cause a substantial increase in sharable revenues, franchise condemna-
tion conceivably could have a great influence on the NFL as a
national business entity.
This argument-that the NFL's interest in shared revenues and
league interdependency is harmed by condemnation-all but disap-
pears when, as here, the NFL itself denies the team permission to
move. The NFL's interest in team location is even more questionable
in light of the importance of national television: "Subject to the
caveat that television revenues in part reflect local fan identification
with local teams, the importance of team location may be sharply lim-
ited by the role of television."94
The Raiders II court emphasized the interests that team owners
have in the quality and economic stability of other league teams, 95 but
obscured the real problem by failing to consider the teams' common
interests in preserving overall fan support for NFL teams. A move
for financial gain by an already successful, avidly supported team,
damages fan support. The court also failed to credit the city's interest
in maintaining the financial viability of the team. This interest
enhances the team's value to the community. For example, a success-
ful NFL team may enhance the city's attractiveness to business inves-
tors. To the extent that the city has an interest in preserving the
public use of the team after condemnation, the court's suggestion that
the team would become permanently "indentured to the local com-
93. Raiders II, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 420, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 157. The Coliseum court
recognized the legitimate interest that the NFL has in ensuring league integrity and the
cooperation therefore necessary to establish schedules and playing rules. Such cooperation
would produce "the most marketable product attainable." Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1391-92.
One commentator has argued:
A sports league brings together several legally distinct and independently owned
firms (the individual clubs) to create a single product: sporting events. In an
obvious sense, the individual clubs are on-field rivals and have divergent
interests. But because the clubs must cooperate to produce the league product,
they have a common interest in collective decisions about the way to make the
product. Clubs are also economically interdependent because they agree to share
certain revenues.
Comment, supra note 77, at 1000.
94. Kurlantzick, Thoughts on Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws: Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, 15 CONN. L. REV. 183, 200
(1983).
95. Raiders II, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 420, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
1206
CITY OF OAKLAND v. OAKLAND RAIDERS
munity" belies the true interest the city has in maintaining the team's
efficiency and success. 96
Condemnation of a football team empowers the city to compel a
change in ownership by taking the team away from one private owner
and subsequently transferring it to another private owner.9 If giving
the city the power to choose franchise owners is considered to be
harmful to the national structure of the NFL, because of the financial
interdependency of the teams and their collective interest in assuring
competent ownership, then that problem could be solved by subject-
ing the city's choice of owners to NFL approval. If the NFL has the
right to approve new owners, then its ability to control ownership
arguably is not harmed by the city's action. 98 Another solution would
be to retransfer the team to the original owner with the added provi-
sion that he keep the team in the city. 99
Even if the eminent domain power can force a team to remain in
the city, a city can only force the team to remain as long as market
forces allow. The city (and any private owner to whom the city trans-
fers the team) has an interest in keeping the team economically effi-
cient, perhaps even to the extent of subsidizing the franchise during
hard times. Otherwise, market forces will ultimately force the team
out of business. Thus, the city has a considerable interest in maintain-
ing the viability of the team, which ultimately benefits the NFL. The
Raiders H court arguably overstated the harm to the NFL by predict-
ing that all cities will condemn football teams that seek to relocate. oo
One impediment to this possibility is financial. Condemnation of a
successful football franchise comes at a high price because of this suc-
cess. Cities may be forced to placate a team by offering stadium
improvements or other concessions, which conceivably cost less than
condemnation and its attendant litigation when the local team threat-
ens to move.101
96. Id.
97. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1240.120(b) (West 1982) (allows the retransfer of
condemned property if reservations and restrictions are imposed to preserve the public use);
see also City of San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal. 2d 52, 279 P.2d 529 (1955) (stringent controls
must be maintained). Although a specific retransfer provision was not before the Raiders II
court, such an agreement could either: 1) require the new owner to keep the Raiders in
Oakland, or 2) provide for the team's transfer to another owner if the new owner ever wanted
to relocate.
98. If the other team owners want the team to relocate, however, then the NFL would be
harmed by the action. The only question would then be the extent of the harm.
99. Although this seems a strange result, retransfer to the original owner would be the
fairest solution if the owner prefers to keep the team, even if he is forced to keep it in Oakland.
100. Raiders II, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
3300 (1986).
101. See id. at 420, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
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The Raiders II court also stated that the NFL would be harmed
by the teams' loss of bargaining power should cities be able to
threaten condemnation. 0 2 The court's argument, however, obscured
the true nature of the bargaining power inequalities that now exist. A
football team is an important tenant for a stadium, because a stadium
operator can obtain relatively higher rent from an NFL tenant than
from other stadium users. 103 Further, because the demand for profes-
sional football teams far exceeds the supply, cities do not have much
bargaining power over the terms of stadium leases."o By upholding
the teams' unilateral right to relocate without considering the city's
interest, the Raiders II court virtually eliminated what little bargain-
ing power the city may have had. The antitrust exemptions given to
the NFL' 5 have worked to extinguish market forces that otherwise
would have caused an increase in franchises. Cities have become "vic-
tims of [this] manipulation"' 106 and are at the mercy of teams enticed
to relocate by other cities. The concessions a city must make to retain
its team ultimately harm the taxpayers."0 7 Thus, although the court
was legitimately concerned about unequal bargaining power, it
focused its concern on the wrong party.
Because the court misconstrued the NFL's structure, and over-
stated both the financial harm to the NFL and a team's potential loss
of bargaining power, there is no compelling need for national uni-
formity. National uniformity-when it is a recognized interest-is,
however, implicit in a test that balances burdens on interstate com-
merce and benefits to the local public. In other words, if the need for
national uniformity is strong in a given case, it will prevail in the bal-
ancing analysis. Because the various methodologies used to examine
commerce clause cases are not neat and separate tests, but collapse
into each other, and because the NFL's structure defies clear defini-
102. Id.
103. See Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1394.
104. See Gorton, Professional Sports Franchise Relocation, Introductory Views From the
Hill, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 2 (1985) ("Due to the enormous discrepancy between the
demand for professional sports teams and the supply, particularly in football and baseball, it is
extremely difficult for any local officials to make meaningful demands on a team negotiating a
lease.").
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). Professional sports are exempt from antitrust laws with
respect to radio and television contracts and league mergers. Because of the NFL's limited
antitrust exemption, it can sell television rights to the league's entire schedule of games and
then divide the revenues equally among the teams.
106. Gorton, supra note 104, at 3.
107. See id. Because of congressional intervention permitting the NFL to set the number of
franchises, Senator Gorton recommends either a return to the free market system-that is,
removal of the limited antitrust immunity-or regulation to correct the market imperfections.
Id. at 6.
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tion, the Raiders H court's attempt to use a single definitional cate-
gory is myopic and misleading. Although the city's use of the
eminent domain power to restrict team movement may burden inter-
state commerce, the resultant burdens are not so compelling as to be
conclusive on the commerce clause issue. Absent an overriding need
for national uniformity, another line of analysis-namely a balancing
test-becomes the relevant commerce clause methodology.
C. Balancing the Burdens and Benefits of Condemnation
Under a balancing test,108 a city's interest in condemnation may
outweigh any burden imposed on the NFL when the taking involves a
financially stable team, like the Raiders, and where the city is simply
preserving the status quo. 0 9 After condemnation, the team could
continue making profits even if those profits are less than conceivably
could be made elsewhere. Moreover, Al Davis's decision to move was
not prompted by his desire to increase shared NFL revenues, but by a
desire to increase unshared revenues (luxury boxes and cable televi-
sion). ' Depriving the Raiders of these unshared revenues negligibly
burdens the NFL, because the extent of revenue sharing greatly
decreases the importance of local revenues. Indeed, in the Coliseum
case, the NFL argued that its interest was to preserve confidence in
the league by recognizing the city's investment in the team and retain-
ing this important asset in the city."' Requiring the Raiders to play
in Oakland, therefore, may not have as much an effect on the NFL
and on interstate commerce as the Raiders II court suggested." 2
Once it is recognized that the city and its fans have greatly con-
tributed to the success of the team, their interests in the financially
108. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). See Maltz, supra note 57 (critique of
commerce clause balancing analysis).
109. Although Oakland's interest in retaining the Raiders might have prevailed in this case,
it should be remembered that this test is a balancing test. Results would vary depending on the
circumstances of each case. See Note, supra note 5, at 966 (arguing that aquisition of the
Raiders is a proper exercise of the city's eminent domain power).
A caveat is also in order. This discussion assumes that the team is not violating a lease
agreement with the stadium when it seeks relocation. If a lease agreement is still in effect at
the time the team relocates, the franchisee may be liable for contract damages.
110. See supra note 5.
111. In the case of the Raiders move, perhaps the NFL would have benefitted from the
city's action because the NFL itself tried (and failed) to prevent relocation. The NFL,
however, is burdened insofar as it wants control of relocation decisions. A more extensive
analysis of the burdens and benefits of preventing relocation is warranted, because the NFL
has not opposed relocation in other cases.
112. One commentator has argued that "if a team is forced to stay in an unprofitable or less
profitable location, the overall economic well-being of the league will be affected because of the
economic interdependency of the teams." Comment, supra note 45, at 790. Unrestrained
relocation, however, could conceivably cause greater damage to this well-being, because fan
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stable team should not be disregarded. Just as the NFL's interests are
both pecuniary (shared revenues generated by the individual
franchises) and nonpecuniary (fan support and league integrity), the
city's interests are both pecuniary and nonpecuniary.I 3  The city's
economic interests include its enhanced ability to attract industry and
outside investors because of the presence of a football team." 4 Eco-
nomic analysis as applied to football, however, is both one-dimen-
sional and deceptive. A fan's emotional attachment to his team defies
pure economic analysis, which assumes rationality. Indeed, this case
is a result of fans being fanatical about their team.
In addition to providing jobs and revenue for cities and citizens,
professional sports teams foster a sense of civic pride." 5 The nexus
support and identification would diminish and thereby reduce the potential drawing power of
all the teams.
If the city is given the right to control ownership of a team contemplating relocation, then
the question arises whether this right could, or should, extend to controlling ownership to
preserve the quality of the team. If the city has an interest in the economic viability of the
team for eminent domain purposes, does not the city have an interest in ensuring that the team
owners preserve the quality of the team and keep it economically efficient? The city could get
rid of "bad" owners and replace them with owners who would work harder to make the team
financially sound and promote public support. See Wong, supra note 5, at 12 n.26 (owners
have been called "28 successful, hard driving individualists," "28 kings," "28 egomaniacs,"
and "28 idiots") (citations omitted). Ultimately, this system could help the NFL. An interest
in economic efficiency, however, is not necessarily a recognized interest under the commerce
clause. The city cannot force a market to be efficient. See Maltz, supra note 57, at 80-81.
113. See Gorton, supra note 104, at 1 ("[P]rofessional sports teams are important
community assets economically and psychologically."); Comment, supra note 45, at 791
(discussing both economic and general welfare interests, noting that recreation is a valid public
interest for both eminent domain and police power purposes); see also Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954) (city may be beautiful as well as clean); Martin v. Philadelphia, 420 Pa. 14, 17,
215 A.2d 894, 896 (1966) (The court upheld a construction loan for a stadium noting that
"public projects are not confined to providing only the bare bones of municipal life, such as
police protection, streets, sewers, light, and water; they may provide gardens, parks,
monuments, fountains, [and] museums.").
114. See Gorton, supra note 104, at 1 (A professional sports team can attract both business
and trade to a city.).
115. See id.; Wong, supra note 5, at 11. Franchise relocation restrictions also promote fan
loyalty and financial stability. A proposed, but unpassed Senate bill, precipitated by the
Coliseum court's decision identified these psychological interests:
Senator Gorton's "Professional Sports Team Community Protection Act" [S.
287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. S663 (1985)] is designed to provide a
right of first refusal to a metropolitan area before a professional sports franchise
is moved. Interestingly, the findings and policy section of the bill indicates that
sports franchises "achieve a strong local identity with the people of the
community in which they play, and provide a source of pride and entertainment
to their supporters." The bill also refers to the "strong public interest" in teams
and recognizes that owners will often seek relocation solely for their own benefit
and financial gain .... [T]he bill recognizes the broader social significance of
sports teams and integrates values that go well beyond the limits of permissible
antitrust inquiry.
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between fans and "their" teams is a utility derived from an exercise of
community, not simply a private utility. It is a celebration of identity,
touching upon the deep roots that make up a civic entity. It is the
coming together of loyalties-an emotional catharsis-that makes
football so special. There are some functions in society that cannot be
disaggregated into private utilities. Rather, their intrinsic utility flows
from the aggregate. Each individual's utility can only be satisfied in
conjunction with others who are also attempting to exercise their indi-
vidual utility at the same time. The team then becomes a spiritual
and emotional surrogate for its fans. "Professional sports are set up
for the enjoyment of the paying customers and not solely for the bene-
fit of the owners or the benefit of the players. Without public support
any professional sport would soon become unprofitable to the owners
and the participants." '16 Public support, evidenced by both fan loy-
alty and traditional rivalries, is hurt every time a team relocates. Fans
will be less likely to support a team, especially a new one, if the team
can relocate on a whim. 17 One commentator has stated that capri-
cious relocation
could be detrimental to the team's city, which may have invested
money in building a stadium, and to the fans who have become
emotionally attached to their team. Additionally, the league may
be harmed; cities would be less likely to invest in the league if its
teams moved too often. Without such investment, the league
would be unable to place teams in certain markets, thus preventing
valuable economic competition, and community service."'
Moreover, without at least some guarantee of exclusivity, the expense
and risk of beginning a franchise may be prohibitive. 1 9 Therefore,
although it is in the city's interest to prevent relocation to preserve fan
support, it is also ultimately in the NFL's interest to do the same.
Restraints on relocation promote "cooperative scheduling . . .
league legitimacy, community support and public service, and league
profitability."' 2 In addition, the NFL's goodwill is protected because
fans may view frequent relocations as evidence of indifference to fan
Lazaroff, supra note 77, at 219.
116. Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 287 (8th Cir. 1978); Conrad v.
City of Pittsburgh, 421 Pa. 492, 218 A.2d 906 (1966) (loss of team is tragedy for community).
117. See Kurlantzick, supra note 94, at 196; Riga, Professional Sports and the Public
Interest: A Kick in the Grass, 7 WHITrIER L. REV. 551, 573 (1985); see also State v.
Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, 730-31, 144 N.W. 2d 1, 18 (1966).
118. Glick, Professional Sports Franchise Movements and the Sherman Act: When and
Where Teams Should Be Able to Move, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 55, 84 (1983).
119. See Kurlantzick, supra note 94, at 197. Exclusivity describes the team's interest in
keeping its territory free of another football team that may compete with it.
120. Glick, supra note 118, at 80.
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loyalty. Protection of goodwill in turn ensures continued economic
viability.1 2 1 In Coliseum, the NFL urged the court to recognize its
interest in preventing relocation before a city has recouped its invest-
ment in a stadium and other facilities in order to prevent the erosion
of local confidence in the NFL. 122
Although frequent relocation is a deterrent to city investment,
one commentator has suggested that restricting relocation would
make private investments more risky because market decision-making
would be replaced by political decision-making. Politicians may not
be interested in pure efficiency and profit. 1 23 This argument, however,
assumes that fans are as interested in football qua football as they are
in specific teams with which they have come to identify. It is the
unity of identification that helps foster rivalries and team support.
Allowing relocation to the detriment of fan support is risky insofar as
the NFL is concerned.
Recognizing these psychological interests, cities invest substan-
tial amounts of money to attract teams and build stadiums, 124 thereaf-
ter viewing their teams as community assets serving significant
community interests. 25 The economic impact of having a team leave
the city is substantial, as is exemplified by New York's $33 million
loss when the Jets moved to New Jersey.' 26 Team relocations may
leave taxpayers burdened with the costs of an expensive stadium origi-
nally built to house a team or to attract one that has left another
city. 1 27 One commentator has stated:
[S]ports leagues may be concerned about the impact of relocations
on the financing arrangements in stadium leases. It is common
practice for public agencies to finance the construction of sports
stadia. If a team moves or fails, taxpayers are left supporting a
limited-use facility that may be incapable of generating other reve-
nues. Avoidance of resentment and ill will, at a minimum, there-
fore, counsels limitations on transfer and entry. 128
Professor Riga has suggested that, in order to preserve the public
interest in fan loyalty and stability, a team should give an assurance to
the city that the team will not move without the city's consent unless
it can prove financial loss. 129  This proposal recognizes the
121. Id. at 84.
122. Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1396.
123. Comment, supra note 10, at 898.
124. See Gorton, supra note 104, at 2.
125. See Wong, supra note 5, at 12.
126. See id. at 11 n.18.
127. See Riga, supra note 117, at 573; Kurlantzick, supra note 94, at 196.
128. Kurlantzick, supra note 94, at 196.
129. See Riga, supra note 117, at 578.
1212
CITY OF OAKLAND v. OAKLAND RAIDERS
noneconomic forces at work in team relocation controversies. Indian-
apolis, for example, invested millions of dollars to attract the Balti-
more Colts. Tomorrow, if another, more "attractive" community
builds a better stadium and offers better lease terms, or greater cable
television or luxury-box revenues, Indianapolis might lose its team to
the same fate as did Baltimore. The taxpayers will then foot the bill
for an empty stadium. Oakland Mayor Lionel Wilson articulated this
interest:
After 22 years in Oakland, and 12 years of sold-out attendance in
the 54,000 seat Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum stadium with
ticket prices among the highest in the NFL, the Oakland Raiders
threatened to move to Los Angeles in 1980 .... [T]he taxpayers of
Oakland and Alameda County provided a facility now worth more
than $75 million. The City and County are now $30 million "in
the hole" as a result of Coliseum operations, and will continue to
pay $1,500,000 per year until the year 2004 in order to retire the
construction bond obligation. 130
In the end, if teams are allowed to relocate, cities may be less willing
to build stadiums and compete for franchises, possibly causing a
shortage of adequate facilities. Such a shortage would hurt the NFL
as well as the public.1 3 '
D. Other Possible Rationales
Other approaches that must be considered in evaluating Raiders
II are the local embargo and prohibition on outgoing commerce ratio-
nales, which have at times been used to identify violations of the dor-
mant commerce clause.' 32 Because the commerce clause is intended
to facilitate interstate movement, the nature of the interstate product
in question must be defined before the burden can be evaluated. Here,
the product produced-football games-must be distinguished from
the business itself. The Coliseum court characterized the product as
130. Wong, supra note 5, at 31 (quoting testimony from Professional Sports Team Protection
Act: Hearings on S. 2505 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 40 (1984)).
131. Although there has not been a shortage to date, once cities realize that teams can
relocate on a whim, they may be less willing to improve old stadiums.
132. See Raiders II, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 421 n.3, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 157 n.3; Comment,
Taking a Sports Franchise, supra note 57, at 582-83 (A state cannot act to satisfy local
demands first, at the expense of other states.); Comment, supra note 45, at 788 ("State actions
which discriminate economically against other states are violative of the Commerce Clause.");
see also Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (state statute requiring a
reciprocity agreement with another state before the other state's milk could be imported
violated commerce clause); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (price
regulation prohibiting sale of milk below certain price violated commerce clause).
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"the NFL season culminating in the Super Bowl." '133 Preventing a
team's relocation would not restrict interstate commerce in that prod-
uct. Oakland was not preventing the Raiders from playing outside
the state. It was not restricting telecasts of Raiders games or prohibit-
ing Oakland residents from watching telecasts of other games. Nor
did the city propose to limit the importation of other types of
entertainment that might detract from the public's interest in football.
Because the product's movement would not be restricted, any burden
on interstate commerce would be the indirect financial burden to the
NFL should teams be forced to remain in unprofitable locations. The
condemnation itself, however, is not a local embargo because it does
not restrict importation or exportation of the product (football
games).
Under the second theory, prohibition on outgoing commerce, the
restraint in question is that imposed on the franchise and its home
games. The taking, it can be argued, discriminates against other
states by preventing their acquisition of the team; Oakland is, in
effect, hoarding its football team or the home games of the team. If
team A plays team B in A's stadium, is team A's city importing or
exporting the product, football games? The answer is difficult because
these are not typical goods being produced for sale elsewhere. Team
B, the visiting team, is an import. It is a necessary ingredient to the
product. Team B is free to travel to another team's home games. The
output, the game, is consumed in city A and is also exported to the
rest of the country by television. The city is hoarding home games
because another city is prevented from having team A play its home
games there. Home games, however, are only a component of a
greater football product. Therefore, even if the city is hoarding home
games, the product (football) can still be consumed by out-of-staters.
Thus, the impact on interstate commerce of hoarding home games is
slight. 134
133. Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1389. By characterizing the product as the total package of
football games, yet rejecting the NFL owners' single-entity argument with respect to league
restrictions on team relocation, the Coliseum decision implicity supports the idea that
uniformity is not a compelling interest in every case. The Coliseum court stated that:
[T]he exceptional nature of the industry makes precise market definition
especially difficult. To a large extent the market is determined by how one
defines the entity: Is the NFL a single entity or partnership which creates a
product that competes with other entertainment products for the consumer (e.g.,
television and fans) dollar? Or is it 28 individual entities which compete with one
another both on and off the field for the support of the consumers of the more
narrow football product?
Id. at 1394.
134. [A] team can be likened to a manufacturer which produces a product: in this
case the product is games. Keeping a team in a given state does not prevent the
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Insofar as the restraint is seen as the restriction of the right of a
business to move to a more profitable location, right to travel con-
cerns are raised.'35 Although there is some question as to whether the
right to travel applies to corporations, some courts have argued that
the right is, at least in part, bottomed in the commerce clause. 136
Although the Raiders' move was in-state, courts have acknowledged
that the right to intrastate travel is implied by the right to interstate
travel.13 7 Plainly, if there is such a right to relocate in order to use
assets more profitably, this is not a right to be taken lightly. But any
such right is ancillary to the need to assure a free interstate flow of the
product itself. The question then is whether prohibiting the underly-
ing organization from moving would impair this flow because the
business could not compete as vigorously in the national market.
Such a determination requires a balancing of burdens and benefits as
discussed in the previous section. It is important once again to recog-
movement of the product, the games, between the states. National viewers can
view the Colts as readily whether the team is located in Indianapolis or
Baltimore.
Comment, supra note 45, at 789.
135. Several commentators have suggested that condemnation of a football franchise
restricts that franchise's movement throughout the United States and therefore violates its
right to travel. One author has suggested that interstate commerce is burdened by the
reduction of "the number of businesses that pass through interstate commerce." Note, supra
note 9, at 191. The right to travel (more precisely, the right of individual interstate migration)
is a recognized constitutional right, although not explicitly required by the constitution. See
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 670-71 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958). For a general
discussion of the right to travel, see Comment, The Right to Travel: In Search of a
Constitutional Source, 55 NEB. L. REV. 117 (1975); Note, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to
Travel, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1129 (1975).
136. See Guest, 383 U.S. at 758-59; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941);
Comment, Taking a Sports Franchise, supra note 57, at 578; Note, supra note 9, at 189 ("It is
difficult to imagine an interest compelling enough to justify restraining the movement and,
necessarily, the expansion of business in interstate commerce."). But see supra notes 113-30
and accompanying text (description of the city's interests).
137. See King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971); In re White, 97 Cal. App. 3d 141, 148, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 567
(1979). The Supreme Court has not decided the extent of this right. See Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974); Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.
Supp. 1242, 1261-62 (M.D. Pa.) (Under California law, an infringement of the right to travel
intrastate is evaluated by a balancing test.), aff'd without opinion, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976); In re White, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 148 n.3, 158 Cal.
Rptr. at 567 n.3. The Raiders I trial court reasoned that even if the right to travel applied to
franchises, it was not a valid defense to the taking. See Comment, Taking a Sports Franchise,
supra note 57, at 579 (citing City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044, slip op. at 24
(Cal. Super. Ct. Monterey County filed July 16, 1984) (Tentative Decision) ("[The fact that
such acquisition of property prevents its relocation, or interferes with the desire of its owner to
move to another location, would not be a valid objection to the taking." Otherwise, the owner
of intangible property could "insulate it from acquisition by merely asserting a desire to
relocate it.")).
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nize the curious fact that in Raiders II allowing movement in the face
of NFL opposition actually undermines collective action in the
national market.
E. Securing the Public Interest
Evaluating the public interest requires two steps.13 First, the
court must identify what is the public interest. Here, the interest is in
recreation, symbolic value, city spirit, and pride. 139 Once the court
has identified this interest, it should examine why the public interest
requires the city's intervention. There must be some reason why the
city's intervention is needed to secure this public interest as opposed
to other, less burdensome, alternatives. For example, if a city wished
to condemn land to build a needed stadium, and the city were the
only entity that could afford to build the stadium, then the second
step would be met, and the city could condemn the land. Here, the
only way for the city to secure the public interest is to change team
ownership in order to keep the team in the city. Public ownership is
not required. Only the city's use of its eminent domain power to com-
pel a change in ownership is needed, because the present owner can-
not be induced to stay. If the real burden is examined, and the city's
real goal is analyzed, then it is evident that the city is not abusing its
power. 140
V. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE COURT'S DECISION
The eminent domain power undeniably is a traditional power of
state sovereignty that commands great importance in the balancing
process. The question has become whether and when condemnation
is a valid means to an acceptable police power end. The conflict
between the city's exercise of the eminent domain power and the con-
stitutional limitation of state regulation imposed by the commerce
clause is a result of the federalist system upon which the nation was
founded. The city asserts authority to protect the welfare of its citi-
138. This analysis is analogous to the Pike test, which requires a showing that the local
action is the least restrictive alternative. The least restrictive alternative test was developed in
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). Commentators have suggested
various alternatives, presumably less intrusive than the eminent domain power. See Comment,
supra note 45, at 790 (contract consessions and reimbursement provisons if team moves);
Comment, Taking a Sports Franchise, supra note 57, at 583 (purchasing or aiding a private
party to purchase the team on the open market). These suggestions only work if the team
wishes to cooperate. Without such cooperation, the city's only option to secure the public's
interest in recreation and to protect its economic investment-from which the team and the
NFL have benefited-is a condemnation action.
139. Recreation is a valid public use. See supra note 41.
140. See supra note 138.
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zens: such welfare has frequently been held to include recreation.
Because such an interest would be recognized under the city's emi-
nent domain power, and because the city is not seeking to prevent
out-of-state competition or restricting the flow of the goods into inter-
state commerce, the condemnation should be evaluated with a balanc-
ing test.
Although the local benefits test under the commerce clause is
fuzzy, the public use test of the eminent domain power is broad
enough to encompass that test. As with public use, public purpose
under the commerce clause lacks a clearly articulable definition. Fur-
ther, the question of whether a public purpose is sufficient to justify a
burden on interstate commerce will not be reached if the regulation is
discriminatory on its face or its intent is to protect local interests from
interstate competition. 41 The question that remains to be answered is
how the court could have decided the case and avoided the conceptual
muddle created by the amorphous structure of the NFL, the compet-
ing interests at stake, and the interrelationship between the commerce
clause and eminent domain analysis. 142
There are at least two conceivable reasons why the court avoided
balancing the interests: (1) the unique, amorphous structure and
competitive/cooperative nature of the NFL; and (2) the inextricably
related economic and welfare interests that football fosters. The inter-
ests involved in the case extend beyond normal, rational economic
interests. They are subjective in nature and difficult to define. 14 3
When combined, interests that are clearly recognizable in a typical
eminent domain or commerce clause case become painfully obscured.
For this reason, some commentators have suggested that Congress is
the body best able to resolve the competing interests at stake."14
Even if balancing the relevant interests is difficult, courts should
141. Maltz, supra note 57, at 61.
142. See Berger, supra note 34. Professor Berger suggests that courts must weigh the
benefit to the condemnor against the harm to the condemnee to determine whether a taking is
appropriate. Id. at 241. Although both eminent domain and commerce clause analyses
involve a balancing test, the eminent domain analysis would not come into conflict with the
commerce clause analysis unless the burden on the condemnee also burdened interstate
commerce. When an NFL team is condemned, it is the burden on the NFL that creates
potential burdens upon interstate commerce rather than the burden on the team.
143. Indeed it is difficult to define precisely what the NFL is.
144. One author recommends legislative action because "[t]he arguments supporting the
proposition that any property or interest therein can be condemned are well founded in
established eminent domain practice and theory." Note, supra note 32, at 149; see Comment,
Taking a Sports Franchise, supra note 57, at 584 (Congress is the only body able to balance the
competing interests involved); Note, The Professional Sports Community Protection Act:
Congress' Best Response to Raiders, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 345 (1987) (discussing legislative
alternatives).
1987] 1217
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1185
not abdicate their responsibility to do so. In trying to avoid the tough
questions, the courts in the Raiders cases applied inappropriate tests.
The courts continuously appealed to the legislature for regulation. 145
The judges mistakenly viewed a difficulty in identifying and analyzing
competing interests as bespeaking a need for federal control.
The Raiders H court fumbled in a last effort to achieve a result it
considered fair. The court may have acted on an instinctive notion
that there is something not quite right about allowing a city to con-
demn a football team. Notwithstanding recognition of the city's inter-
ests in retaining the team, there is an inherent difficulty in accepting
municipal power that enters into an area seemingly as private as the
ownership of a football team. Although there are intrinsic concep-
tual, and perhaps, social difficulties in the condemnation of a profes-
sional football team, the present methodologies used by the courts
allow condemnation. If the courts are troubled by the results these
methodologies compel, they should limit the reach of the tests rather
than refusing to apply them.
If the commerce clause does not provide a legally justifiable basis
for invalidating the condemnation, how then can the Raiders H
court's decision be explained? There must be some deeper, perhaps
subconscious, ideological considerations at work in the court's opin-
ion.' 46 Perhaps the court found itself intellectually troubled by the
same incredulity that most people experience when they consider the
possibility that a city could condemn a football team. That a city
could take a football team is a concept offensive even to scholars
highly educated in the law of eminent domain. 147 It is not enough,
145. See Raiders 1, 32 Cal. 3d at 76, 646 P.2d at 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 683 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); Raiders II, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 421, 220 Cal. Rptr. at
158.
146. See Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 735
(1985). Professor Bender states:
The requirement of reference to constitutional precedent serves only to put
rhetorical reins on total judicial abandon. Constitutional decisionmaking has
become political decisionmaking-political results translated into legal
rationalizations. Justices ask themselves how they want their society structured;
what theory they believe would promote the dominant ideology of the day; what
they think the rules ought to be; and what they want the result in a particular
case to be.
Id. at 812.
147. See, e.g., Sackman, Public Use-Updated (City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders), 1983
INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 203. Professor Sackman states that a public
use must be "one based on historical conditions predicated on the basis of variations in local
conditions, or one in which the interest of the state is of such profound or fundamental interest
as to be essential to its very existence." Id. at 232. Professor Sackman refuses to recognize
Oakland's social, economic, and recreational interests as substantial. Accordingly, he finds
Oakland's interest "petty" and not one that meets constitutional criterion for a public use. Id.
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however, simply to note this ideological abhorrence to the taking-be
it conscious or subconscious-which arguably underlies the court's
decision. The interesting question is why the court was forced to rely
on incorrect legal theory to support a decision it found ideologically
more acceptable. What is it about eminent domain, and in particular,
public use, that forced this theoretically practical-if legally question-
able-decision?
Conspicuously, the Raiders II court did not decide the public use
issue, preferring instead, to invalidate the attempted taking on com-
merce clause grounds. 14 Because the City of Oakland did not dispute
the fact that it was attempting to take property within the meaning of
the eniment domain clause, the only issue for the Raiders II court to
decide was the public use issue, not whether there in fact had been a
taking. The Raiders II court attempted to use the commerce clause
issue to act as an implicit limit on the doctrine of public use. 14 9
Many commentators have also attempted to find some kind of
limit on the public use doctrine. 150  These attempts, however, have
only prompted vigorous discussion between scholars while falling on
deaf ears in the courts.1 51 These debates parallel the discussions sur-
rounding the broader issue of compensable takings. A perfunctory
analysis suggests that the same theoretical debates over when there is
at 234. The examples he uses to support this proposition, however, undercut his conclusion.
He relies on Midkiff v. Tom, 471 F. Supp. 871 (D. Haw. 1979) (land reform to revive a dying
community), and Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Assocs., 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir.) (agrarian
reform to avert a civil war), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 772 (1946). Surely the government is not
forced to wait until its community is dying or on the verge of civil war before it can use its
eminent domain power to solve social and economic problems. The courts are far from this
conclusion. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text; see also Bender, supra note 146
(suggesting that political solutions to economic and social problems involve value judgments
that should not be part of the takings clause). Professor Bender, in her discussion of takings
and public use, suggests that judicial decisionmaking has in reality become political
decisionmaking, hidden by legal rationalizations. Decisions turn on judges' views of how they
want their society structured, and how they can preserve the dominant ideology of the time or
their own value structures. Id. at 812. Public use expands to further economic development
or business interests of politically powerful groups and is "wholly dependent upon the
immediate social, economic, or political visions of legislatures or judges." Id. at 829.
148. 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3300 (1986).
149. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 119, 141 (1984) ("[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related
to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be
proscribed by the Public Use Clause.").
150. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 146 (public use should not encompass political and social
concerns); Berger, supra note 34 (advocating various economic criteria to determine whether
there is a public use); Epstein, An Outline ofTakings, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 3 (1986) (public
use limited by an optimal division of the social surplus as defined by the existing distribution of
resources); Meidinger, supra note 22 (discussing sociological and political limits on the
doctrine of public use).
151. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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a compensable taking1 2 would embrace with equal force the issue of
public use. More rigorous analysis, however, suggests that these par-
ticular debates are unsuited for public use analysis. In determining
whether governmental action is a taking which requires just compen-
sation, theoretical debates are appropriate because they attempt to
determine when the government must pay for its action. Public use,
however, determines whether the government can take the property.
Thus, if an action is not a taking, the result is that the government
does not have to pay. If an action is not for a public use, the result is
that the government cannot engage in the action at all.
The courts are, at the very least, reluctant to tread in this area,
because once an action is held to be outside the public use, the govern-
ment cannot exercise its eminent domain power in that area. The
determination of whether a taking has occurred is a decision "close to
the basic economic and political values of our society." ' It is sub-
merged in philosophical debate over the scope of legitimate govern-
152. See generally Symposium on Richard Epstein's Takings: Private Property and the
Power of Eminent Domain, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1986) (proceedings and critiques of
Richard Epstein's Takings).
The determination of whether a taking has occurred rests largely on underlying
conceptions of property because one must have a property right before the government can
"take" it. Any such determination is necessarily related to a discussion of the proper scope of
government. Commentators have espoused various theories to deal with these concepts. For
example, Richard Epstein embraces a "bundle of rights" view of property (rights to possess,
use, and dispose of property) and bases his political theory on natural rights in his search for a
defensible limit to governmental action. See Paul, Searching for the Status Quo (Book
Review), 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 743, 743 (1986) (discussing Epstein's theory that the fifth
amendment should "prohibit all explicitly redistributional government activity"). Professor
Radin distinguishes between property held for purely economic reasons and property held as
something personal and important to the owner. Thus, Radin takes condemnation theory
outside the realm of pure economic theory by allowing for personal attachments to property.
See Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). The courts, however,
apply a multi-factor test, including (1) the severity of the economic impact, see, e.g.,
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); (2) the character of the governmental
action, see, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); and (3) the
damage to investment-backed expectations, see, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164 (1979).
153. Paul, supra note 152, at 780. Indeed, at least one commentator has suggested that the
development of eminent domain can be explained by reference to economic strength and
political power. In her discussion of Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410
Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981), Professor Bender states:
Why weren't other options taken? Why did economic power equate perfectly
with political power? Poletown represented a survival of the fittest story, where
the fittest was a megacorporation that could wield political clout in the face of a
desperate community. It illustrated a brutal social Darwinism, retreating from
advancements we have made as a civilized people; it was utilitarianism where
utility was defined in terms of corporate, economic prosperity instead of social
cohesion and mutual advancement.
Bender, supra note 146, at 806-07.
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mental action, extending back to such philosophers as Locke and
Hobbes. Political visions are explored and abandoned, reexplored and
resurrected. Such discussion is best left to defining the limits on gov-
ernmental action without compensation, rather than analyzing
whether the government can act at all. Judges are reluctant to deter-
mine as a matter of judicial discretion that the government can never
act in a particular area. 154
Further, there is the question of whether the public use at issue is
the kind of public use that should be turned over to public enterprise.
While some would find in such a concept hints of socialism, it is not a
concept invidious to either the American legal system or traditional
constitutional principles.155 Of course, this condemnation would
meet the broad public use definition, but ideologically, perhaps this
kind of enterprise should not be in public hands. Perhaps there
should be some ideological barrier across the eminent domain power.
The commerce clause, however, which is aimed at securing a national
market free from state imposed barriers, should not be used to cir-
cumvent a legal doctrine aimed at wholly distinct concerns. 156 If foot-
ball is one of the consummate expressions of a community, the
question becomes whether we, as a society, should draw lines and say
that this form of expression can only be fulfilled subject to the whim
of the franchise owner, or whether we should recognize that this
expression is a uniquely civic function, subject to traditional govern-
mental powers such as eminent domain. The Raiders II opinion sim-
ply did not meet the intellectual challenge the case posed to the court.
LISA J. TOBIN-RUBIO*
154. A broad interpretation of public use "removes determinations about governmentally
required private property transfers from judicial consideration." Bender, supra note 146, at
811.
155. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,' dissenting) ("[A]
Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory .... "). Justice Holmes's
dissent and subsequent cases stand for the proposition that the Constitution is not necessarily
structured upon any one view of society or economic theory. See United States v. Carolene
Prod., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
156. Indeed, the Court's whole concept of a market participant exception to the commerce
clause supports the proposition that the Court will not intrude, by means of the commerce
clause, into the philosophical issues involved in governmental action. The Court has indicated
an intention, at least insofar as commerce clause jurisprudence is concerned, to let the political
process determine the mix of public and private use in society.
* This Note is dedicated with appreciation to my family for their guidance and love and
to Julian whose patience and support helped me see this Note to publication.' Thanks to Alan
Rolnick for his time, advice, and substantive critique.
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